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Abstract. In 1918, Slovenia became a constituent part of Yugoslavia. After the Second World 
War, Yugoslavia was reconstituted as a socialist state. When the attempts to turn Yugoslavia 
into a democratic country failed, Slovenia decided to become independent. As it is reflected in 
its new Constitution (1991), Slovenia is designed as a parliamentary republic, as a unitary state 
with local self-government and is strives to become a social state. During the transition from 
socialism, Slovenian law faced numerous challenges like the privatization of economy. The 
political and legal transition is still taking place. Hopefully, the entry to the European Union 
will give it new dimensions. 
 Between the two world wars, Slovenian legal science was especially influenced by Austrian-
German legal positivism; although the legal-comparative, sociological and axiological methods 
were important as well. After the Second World War, in some critical periods an apologetic 
legal positivism gained the upper hand in certain areas. On the other hand, new legal institutes 
and departments furthered the development of new sciences (criminology, sociology of 
law, political economy, public administration). New scientific areas emerged (comparative 
commercial law, comparative labour law and the law of the European Union). Some legal 
sciences (like criminal law) have been enriched by additional (sociological, axiological and 
comparative methods) methods.  
 
Keywords: apologetic and scientific legal positivism, legal dogmatics, science of positive law, 
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I. Introductory Explanation 
 
This paper is based on an article I wrote on Slovenian legal science in the 20th 
century.1 When preparing that article I did not specifically ask myself about 
the transition from socialist law to traditional law and its resurgence. I was 
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 1 See Marijan Pavčnik: (Ne)vrednost pravoznanstva [The Worth(lessness) of Juris-
prudence], in: Jančar, D.–Vodopivec, P. (Eds.): Slovenci v XX. stoletju (Slovenes in the 
20th Century). Ljubljana, 2001. 77–78. 
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especially interested in the approach and the nature of the object studied by the 
sciences of positive law. I was interested in the concepts of law and legal science 
and tried to cover it completely and to pay attention to the roles we play, either 
as legal observers or legal participants. It is of special importance that through-
out I was centred on a longer period of time than just the period of socialism 
and that I also dealt with so-called socialist law as just a part of the legal 
phenomenon. These are the reasons for my belief that an article on Slovenian 
legal science in the 20th century can also be the basis for observations on the 
theme I will here deal with. 
 
 
II. The (In)adequacy of Legal Positivism  
 
1. Introduction 
 
I believe that a good starting point would be von Kirchmann’s critical and 
provocative treatise “The Worthlessness of Jurisprudence as Science”,2 which 
was published in the middle of the 19th century. Von Kirchmann maintained 
that legal science does not deal with the real, that is, intrinsic law (Germ. das 
natürliche Recht).3 Intrinsic law is independent and free and does not bother 
with whether science exists and whether it is understood by science (p. 7). It is the 
law that lives amongst people and that is put into effect by each individual 
in his environment (p. 7). Intrinsic law encompasses the rich institutions of 
marriage, family, property, contracts, inheritance, status differences, the 
relationship of the government to the people and the relations between nations 
(p. 8). Von Kirchmann expressly maintains that people can live without legal 
science, but certainly cannot live without law (p. 8). It is characteristic of  
intrinsic law that we are not only aware of it, but also feel it, that it is not only 
in our heads, but also in our hearts (p. 17). One problem of legal science is that 
it only deals with intrinsic law within a very limited scope. Nine tenths and 
even more of its object correspond to positive legislation with its numerous 
  
 2 von Kirchmann, J. H.: Die Wertlosigkeit der Jurisprudenz als Wissenschaft. Berlin, 
1848. Reprint: Rudolf Haufe Verlag, Freiburg, Berlin 1990. See also Klenner, H.: Kirchmann 
oder: Die Provokation als Produktivkraft. In: von Kirchmann, J. H.: Die Wertlosigkeit 
der Jurisprudenz als Wissenschaft. Freiburg–Berlin, 1990. 79–98., and Sprenger, G.: Recht 
und Werte. Reflexionen über eine philosophische Verlegenheit. In: Der Staat, 2000. 1, 1–
22. 
 3 I deliberately translate the German expression as “intrinsic law”, which has to be 
distinguished from “natural law” (Germ. Naturrecht). 
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weaknesses and shortcomings; positive statute is rigid, abstract, it contains 
gaps, contradictions and unclear points (pp. 20–21). Within this scope, the 
object of legal science is purely accidental; the accidental positive statute drives 
out intrinsic law and the legal science dealing with positive statutes is itself 
accidental as well. “Three legislative changes suffice to turn whole libraries into 
wastepaper” (p. 23). And also: lawyers have become “little worms living only 
on rotten wood” (p. 23). In short, what is of permanent existence is only the 
legal science dealing with intrinsic law, that is, with the law corresponding to 
the nature of things. 
 Von Kirchmann certainly provokes and exaggerates. Legal science cannot 
avoid positive legislation; it has to analyse, systemize and interpret it. Intrinsic 
law does not suffice unless it is supplemented and elaborated by positive 
legislation. This was the case already in von Kirchmann’s times, even more so 
in the 20th century and still more nowadays. And, last but not least, it is simply 
not true that positive legislation as a whole is porous, inconsistent, and unclear. 
Let us just think of the great codes (such as the Austrian General Civil Code of 
1811) that are still valid today. 
 On the other hand, von Kirchmann’s criticism is also creative. The basic 
question is what the science of positive law should concentrate on and what 
its attitude to its object of research should be. If the results of scientific work 
quickly turn into wastepaper, it is evident that the object and the manner of 
research were badly chosen and realized. In Slovenia, the constitutional system 
of socialist self-management, the laws on associated labour, social property, the 
association of labour and means, labour law, self-management law, etc., were 
certainly examples of the ephemeral results of legal research. 
 
2. Legal Dogmatics, its Objects and its Limits 
 
The science of positive law cannot avoid the valid (positive) legislation. One 
of its tasks is also to dogmatically study positive law, to analyse it concerning 
its meaning and to systemize it. One cannot speak of good law if it is not 
accompanied by qualified and even finely finished legal dogmatics. 
 The object of legal dogmatics is given and is not created by legal science. 
None of its aims is to declare itself for or against its object from the points of 
view of values and legal politics. Legal dogmatics is based on scientific and 
specialist traditions (e.g. those of civil, criminal or administrative law) and, 
on this basis, it studies the valid law. First comes the so-called lower juris-
prudence of concepts, which interprets the statute, establishes its content 
and removes any unclear points and contradictions contained therein. Then 
comes the higher jurisprudence of concepts, which logically and systematically 
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analyses legal concepts and institutions and combines them into a suitable 
system. 
 Such legal dogmatics is a typical representative of scientific positivism, 
which presupposes that the content of positive law is legitimate. A problem arises 
when the object of study is not legitimate or when it begins to lose legitimacy 
partly or completely. The worst solution is for legal science to “overlook” this 
circumstance and to behave as if everything were in the best of order. This is 
already apologetic positivism, which identifies with the valid system and–whether 
willing or unwilling–justifies it.  
 Apologetic legal positivism was–at least to a certain extent–characteristic 
of the socialist period of the 20th century. It was especially emphasized in the 
areas that wanted to radically differ from the traditional Roman-Germanic 
legal family covering the continental part of non-socialist European law. I have 
already enumerated the areas of constitutional law, associated labour law and 
self-management law. 
 Also in the so-called “new” legal areas, responsible theoreticians remained 
true to the scientific character of their basic science, restrained and sometimes 
very critical. As examples, the following deserve mention: Šmidovnik’s research 
of the communal system,4 Bučar’s treatment of public administration and his 
criticism of self-managing communities of interest5 and Cigoj’s insistence on 
traditional civil law.6 Finžgar’s work on social property is a special case; the 
astute expert on civil law did not reject it, but constantly illuminated and 
analysed it with the instruments of civil law and especially property law. The final 
result is well-known: social property law is no longer valid law, yet Finžgar’s 
theory remains and it can also explain how social property should be trans-
formed into other forms of property.7 
 
  
 4 Šmidovnik, J.: Koncepcija jugoslovanske občine (The Concept of Yugoslavian 
Municipality). Ljubljana, 1970. 
 5 Bučar, F.: Uvod v javno upravo (Introduction to Public Administration). Ljubljana, 1969. 
 6 Cigoj, S.: Obligacije − sistem obligacijskega prava v teoriji, sodstvu in primerjalnem 
pravu (Obligations−the System of the General Law of Obligations in Theory, Jurisdiction 
and Comparative Law). Ljubljana, 1976. 
 7 Finžgar, A.: Preoblikovanje družbene lastnine v drugo obliko lastnine (The Trans-
formation of Social Property into Other Forms of Property). In: Zbornik znanstvenih 
razprav, 1992. 5–16. 
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3. Apologetic and Scientific Legal Positivism 
 
The dividing line between apologetic and scientific legal positivism is not 
clearly drawn; it is in the nature of any legal positivism to reject a metaphysical 
approach to the treatment of law and thus sharply separate positive law from 
any value criterion which would be a criterion of law concerning its content. 
The legitimacy of legal positivism can only be judged by someone who tries to 
give meaning to what he does and who is at the same time aware of the fact 
that legal dogmatics is not and cannot be self-sufficient. It is in the nature of 
law that it is a normative phenomenon which in the name of some value pre-
supposes and defines which legal consequence should occur if we find ourselves 
in certain circumstances. Phrased even more clearly: law is a normative phe-
nomenon that regulates social relations and puts values into effect. A legal 
positivist who overlooks that law has a value dimension or even tries to avoid 
it does not have a criterion for distinguishing between apologetic and scientific 
legal positivism.  
 And this is the greatest danger he finds himself in and which even increases 
when he is surrounded by a single-party and monopolistic political system. 
The danger is less marked in those legal areas that are traditionally relatively 
independent (e.g. in the areas of traditional civil law) and much greater in 
the areas that are politically sensitive and simultaneously approached the 
prototypes of a new (e.g. self-management) law. 
 The main works on the science of positive law were produced in the period 
between the two World Wars (especially in the areas of criminal and civil law). 
The conditions after the Second World War were less favourable to science. 
The Stalinist period forced it to adopt apologetic legal positivism, more liberal 
periods broadened the scientific horizons. Throughout this period, however, 
it was also important whether one was dealing with traditional legal areas 
domiciled also in the new system or with areas that were supposed to be typical 
of the new self-management system. 
 These are external circumstances that are certainly important, yet not so 
decisive as to drown out the power and creativity of individuals. While it is 
probably true that the sciences of legal history were more sheltered than the 
sciences of positive law, it nevertheless took the personal contributions of 
Viktor Korošec8 and Sergej Vilfan9 to write excellent works on legal history: 
  
 8 See e.g. Korošec, V.: Die Erbenhaftung nach römischem Recht I. Das Zivil- und 
Amtsrecht. Leipzig, 1927; Hethitische Staatsverträge. Ein Beitrag zu ihrer juristischen 
Wertung. Leipzig, 1931; Hethitica. Prispevek k razvoju hetitskega prava (Hethitica. 
Contribution to the Development of Hethitic Law). Ljubljana, 1958; Keilschriftrecht, in: 
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the former in the field of cuneiform laws and Roman law and the latter in the 
field of the legal history of Slovenes. 
 Individuals reacted to external circumstances in different ways: some 
accepted a good many imaginary innovations and tried to justify them, others 
were aware of the limitations and tried to salvage what could be salvaged 
within the limits of what was possible, another group moved on the margins 
and broadened the scientific space, again others stuck to the legal comparative 
method and discussed foreign law, whereas in reality they were critical of the 
national (e.g. constitutional) law, some stated a few cheap Marxist truths in the 
introduction and then fully applied themselves to their science and there were 
very few who did not show any consideration for external circumstances and 
deal with them in a polemical manner as well. 
 What I would like to say is: irrespective of the fact that some periods were 
really not favourable to science, we have high quality works in most legal areas. 
If some areas are still lacking, it is not just the dark periods of recent history 
that are to blame. The causes lie with ourselves and with the where and how of 
directing our energies. 
 The knowledge I have does not allow me to pass judgment on individual 
works. Nor is such the aim of this paper. I am actually concerned with some-
thing else, namely with the concept of the science of positive law. 
 
4. The Concept of the Science of Positive Law 
 
Historic experience proves that legal dogmatics, which is methodologically 
characteristic of individual sciences of positive law, can never be self-sufficient. 
At least, the science must continuously check whether the positive legal regulation 
expresses the “normative power of the factual” (Germ. die normative Kraft des 
Faktischen). Positive legal regulation always has certain value and sociological 
backgrounds, the social and value contexts co-determine the understanding of 
the statutes and it is the social reality to which the legal behaviour, legal 
violations and legal decision-making lead. These reasons and numerous others 
                                                                                                                                                 
Handbuch der Orientalistik, I/3. Leiden, 1964, and Očrt rimskega prava (Outline of 
Roman Law), 2nd edition. Ljubljana, 1980. 
 9 See e.g. Vilfan, S.: Pravna zgodovina Slovencev (The Legal History of Slovenes). 
Ljubljana, 1961; Rechtsgeschichte der Slowenen (= Grazer Rechts- und Staatswissen-
schaftliche Studien 21). Graz, 1968; Jugoslawien, in: Handbuch der Quellen und Literatur 
der neueren europäischen Privatrechtsgeschichte, III/5. München, 1988. 323–470.; 
Zgodovinska pravotvornost in Slovenci (Historische Fähigkeit zur Rechtsbildung und die 
Slowenen). Ljubljana, 1996. 
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confirm that the science of positive law must not live in an ivory tower of 
normativity. If it does, it may easily turn into a dead letter or into an ideological 
ornament used by the political authority. 
 Legal dogmatics loses its firm ground when it deals with positive law past 
its expiration date or when positive law has been false and contrary to the nature 
of things from the very beginning. If positive law is such, life rebels against 
it sooner or later; life demands new criteria that enable it to remain in good 
condition, operate normally and develop further. Legal theory knows numerous 
schools of thought that have rebelled against fossilized legal dogmatics–e.g. 
free law theory, Interessenjurisprudenz, sociological jurisprudence, Wertungs-
jurisprudenz. Several new sciences have developed–e.g. the sociology of law, 
criminology, various legal and economic sciences, in the United States various 
critical jurisprudences have also developed in recent decades. 
 Between the two world wars, Slovenian legal science was especially 
influenced by Austrian-German legal positivism based on the normative-dogmatic 
method; additionally, the legal-comparative, sociological and axiological methods 
gradually became important as well. After the Second World War the develop-
ment was rather uneven. In some critical periods an apologetic legal positivism 
gained the upper hand to a certain extent and in certain areas. It should not be 
overlooked, however, that legal positivism was also a defensive barrier against 
the invasion of legal science by political irrationality and despotism. The 
foundation of several new institutes and departments at the Faculty of Law 
furthered the development of a growing number of sciences (e.g. criminology, 
the sociology of law, political economics, public administration), which 
noticeably broadened the knowledge of law and at the same time connected 
law with the phenomena to which it is vitally linked. It is also important that 
several new scientific areas developed (for example, comparative commercial 
law, recently also comparative labour law and the law of the European Union), 
which are all legally comparative, and among the classical legal sciences, 
some (such as criminal law) have been enriched by additional methods (e.g. by 
sociological, axiological and comparative methods). Concerning the legal-
comparative method, it should probably be added that it has been intensively 
gaining acceptance in all areas of civil law and recently again in the field of 
constitutional law. 
 
5. The Worthlessness of Jurisprudence 
 
And now we should return to von Kirchmann and to his statement that juris-
prudence is “worthless” because its object constantly changes. If the sciences 
of positive law only studied the valid legislation of the day in a normative-
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dogmatic manner, von Kirchmann’s objection would be almost completely 
justified. It is not the task of science to identify with any enacted law, neither 
is its task for the method of research to create its own object of research. Most 
probably, the task of science is to choose the aspect of research, these aspects 
must correspond to the legal phenomenon and the legal phenomenon is certainly 
not encompassed by the positive legislation of the day. Evidently, the science of 
positive law cannot evade positive legislation, yet its mission is also to build 
on previous knowledge, to verify, complement and, if necessary, change this 
knowledge, to consider legal-comparative findings, to assess whether the en-
acted law is rationally designed and in accordance with life (with the so-called 
“nature of things”), to accompany and judge how this law is enforced in life and 
in legal (court) practice, and, last but not least, to propose how some areas could 
be differently and better regulated. If legal science really does this and if its 
research is of good quality, the results thereof are extremely valuable and 
outlive whole generations of legislators. Also in Slovenia numerous works 
have outlived their authors. A classic example is The State (1927) by Leonid 
Pitamic, the content and language of which still make for stimulating reading.10 
 Certainly, fewer works would be falling into oblivion if they had been true to 
the scientific postulates I mentioned above. A frequent weakness is that individual 
researchers focus on so-called “law in books” and neglect “law in action”. An 
important element of living law is court practice, which, within a limited scope, 
also has the nature of case law. During the last decade constitutional law practice 
has also developed, which, however, is not really considered in theoretical works 
either. The shining exception has always been civil law specialists (Cigoj’s 
school), who probably follow court practice in the most intensive manner. 
 Let me stress once more that the science of positive law is certainly not 
“worthless”, but it is evidently not good if the legal positive regulation changes 
too frequently. But things do not change so quickly as it seems at first sight. 
Apart from the novelties introduced by socialism, the basic legal concepts and 
institutions have been changing organically and gradually and, if necessary, 
newly formed (for example, in the field of commercial law). The great 
codifications of the 19th century already played an important role whereby the 
core of modern law was consolidated. Neither should it be overlooked that the 
norms regarding closing legal gaps made it possible after the foundation of the 
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1918, for the legislation valid in 
the territory of Slovenia when it entered the former common state to be used for 
  
 10 Pitamic, L.: Država (The State). Celje, 1927. Reprint: Cankarjeva založba, Ljubljana, 
1996. See also the English edition: A Treatise on the State. J. H. Furst Company, 
Baltimore, 1933.  
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unregulated areas. This means that practically continuously, including to a limited 
extent even in the period of socialism, the classical thought of civil law was 
maintained in Slovenia.  
 
6. Arguments of Unlawfulness, Legal Principles and Understanding of 
 Legal Norms 
 
Von Kirchmann’s critical questions are not sufficient. In the 20th century it was 
again clearly shown that any science, even a positivistic one, does itself a 
disservice if it is not aware of its own limitations. The main drawback is that legal 
positivism does not answer the question of how it should be legally evaluated. 
Legal positivism shuts itself off from the arguments of unlawfulness, legal 
principles and of the understanding of legal norms. All three arguments are of an 
over-positivistic nature and each of them requires answers to value questions. 
The argument of unlawfulness concedes that a valid (positive) legal system may 
be humanly intolerable to such a degree that it has to be denied the nature of 
law. The argument of legal principles considers that each legal system comprises 
value standards directing the definition of legal norms concerning their content 
and the manner of their application. And the argument of the understanding of 
legal norms emphasizes that legal norms are only a result of the understanding 
of a statute in view of factual (practical interpretation) and imagined (methodical 
interpretation) life cases. 
 In the Slovenian legal sphere it was the objection of unlawfulness that fared 
worst. Between the two world wars legal positivism was too strong for this 
question to be raised at all. The most astute thinker was Leonid Pitamic, who 
already in 1917 maintained that also the science of positive law needed 
appropriate prerequisites.11 The criticism of Pure Theory of Law finally led 
him to state that legal regulation “must consider its subject at least to such an 
extent that it does not take away its nature. If law is to remain law, it may only 
command or allow external human behaviour, but not its opposite, ‘inhuman 
behaviour’, if it does not want to lose the nature of law”.12 If I may quote 
myself, let me say that legal regulation must always be within the limits of 
legal rightness and the measure of this rightness comprises−at least in the 
world we belong to−basic human rights, the principles of a state under the rule 
  
 11 See Pitamic, L.: Denkökonomische Voraussetzungen der Rechtswissenschaft. In: 
Österreichische Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht, 1917, 339–367. 
 12 See Pitamic, L.: Naturrecht und Natur des Rechts. In: Österreichische Zeitschrift für 
öffentliches Recht, 7 − N. F. 1956, 194.  
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of law and the institutions of democracy.13 In three cases the argument of 
unlawfulness was also used by the Slovenian Constitutional Court in referring 
to general legal principles acknowledged by civilized nations.14 
 The second objection against legal positivism, i.e. the argument of legal 
principles, fares a little better. It is a majority standpoint that law is only a 
system of legal norms (some speak merely of legal provisions!), yet this does 
not mean that the meaning of legal principles is completely overlooked. The 
theory considers them especially at the level of basic principles characterizing 
individual legal fields and much less as important standards of interpretation. 
The main exceptions are the standpoints of experts in civil and criminal law. It is 
encouraging that the argument of legal principles (especially that of a state under 
the rule of law) has been applied more and more often in the recent practice of 
the Constitutional Court. 
 Of the greatest practical value is the third objection, i.e. the argument of the 
understanding of legal norms. It is an invaluable argument for legal participants 
(for example, for judges), but also for all those legal observers–I am one of 
them– who are of the opinion that legal science must also deal with the nature of 
legal decision-making in concrete cases.15 A chapter on the interpretation of 
statute is contained in practically every systematic work dealing with any legal 
branch. For the most part it does not concern the theory of argumentation and 
legal valuation with special emphasis on the peculiarities of the branch in 
question, but it is more a general review of classical interpretation arguments as 
phrased by von Savigny. 
 We find ourselves in a very sensitive, sometimes even fragile and very 
important legal area. Law is a linguistic and cultural phenomenon which is an 
object of understanding. Legal understanding is not just a reconstruction of a 
thought (a legal norm) reported by the legislator, legal understanding is also the 
final shaping of a legal norm that must lead to a legal decision. The lawyer’s 
(e.g. the judge’s) decision is a value synthesis assessing the normative starting 
point with regard to the factual starting point, and vice versa. In this context the 
interpreter is the one to “reconstruct” the possibilities of the statute, to state the 
content of these possibilities more precisely (if they are uncertain in the statute) 
and to choose the combination that is in the closest accordance with the legally 
  
 13 Pavčnik, M.: Teorija prava (Theory of Law). 2nd Edition. Ljubljana, 2001. 20 and 
479. 
 14 See Pavčnik, M.: Pravni in ustavni temelji prava (Legal and Constitutional 
Foundations of Law). In: Ustavno sodstvo (Constitutional Judiciary). Pavčnik, M. and 
Mavčič, A. (Eds.) Ljubljana, 2000. 396–397. 
 15 Cf. Pavčnik, M.: Juristisches Verstehen und Entscheiden. Wien–New York, 1993. 
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relevant characteristics of the life case. It is in the nature of legal understanding 
and decision-making that it is a creative or at least a co-creative legal act. 
 It is a matter for each theory of law (in the broader sense of the word) how 
it reacts to these questions. The worst solution is to accept the thesis that 
everything has been decided by the legislator and that it is only a question of 
mechanically recreating his decision in a concrete case. This is the so-called 
ideology of the application of law, which always suits the political forces laying 
claim to “creativity” and a monopoly on law-giving. Behind this “ideological 
veil” lies the actual creativity, which is all the more bound to the “ideological 
cliché” the more politically sensitive and important the legal decision is. It is in 
the nature of things that the decision-making in civil law cases is, in principle, 
more autonomous than in administrative and criminal cases where the “ideo-
logical cliché” is much more pronounced. Yet also here there are differences 
between the classic crime and the “socially” especially dangerous “crime”, 
which can be fully exploited as “political crime”.  
 The subject of my paper is not the concrete abuses that were most numerous 
and terrible in the Stalinist period. I would like to say that the ideology of the 
application of law disarms the legal participant and leaves him to his own devices. 
I do not at all wish to blame legal dogmatics for any abuses. I only think that it 
should also be accompanied and supplemented by other theoretical approaches, 
among them especially the theory of interpretation and argumentation in law, i.e. 
approaches that make the legal participant aware of the nature of legal under-
standing and offer him arguments for good decision-making and substantiating. 
I know very well that abuse cannot be avoided in such cases either. It does not 
lie within the power of theory to make abuse impossible, yet it is within its 
power to clearly tell the legal participant that he is also a decision-maker. 
 
7. Law as a Phenomenon of Understanding and Interpretation 
 
The fact that the law is a phenomenon to be understood and interpreted offers 
numerous creative possibilities to legal observers as well as to legal par-
ticipants. If the legal system is to be stable, legal science must assume its share 
of responsibility as well. The constitution, legal codes and basic statutes can 
only live with the help of interpretation. The free law theory, Interessenjuris-
prudenz, Wertungsjurisprudenz are typical foreign examples that enable, for 
instance, the French and the German Civil Codes to still be valid without 
difficulty: the former is nearly two hundred years old  and the latter turned one 
hundred years old at the turn of the millennium. 
 The same is true of the Austrian General Civil Code (of 1811), to which 
Slovenes have the closest relation and which was mentioned above in another 
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connection. This code was of special importance before 1978, when the new 
Act on Torts and Contracts was passed. Until then, torts and contracts were 
actually regulated by the rules of the Austrian General Civil Code of 1811, 
which were actively applied by the courts with the full and firm support of 
civil law theory with its interpretations and comments. The norms of the 
Austrian Civil Code also had an important role in classical law as regards real 
property and movables.  
 This also shows that court practice has an important role as well. It would 
be an exaggeration to say that it is a role approaching that of Anglo-American 
case law; there are certainly numerous similarities between both systems, but 
there are also numerous differences with their own historical background. In 
continental and also in Slovenian law, established court practice supplements 
statute law, normatively implements and rejuvenates it in the long term by 
preventing it from becoming rigid and losing touch with life. In this respect 
much has been achieved in Slovenia in the field of classic civil law. In the 
last ten years, especially since 1994, when the constitutional complaint was 
instituted in practice, the Constitutional Court has done much towards making 
case law statements obligatory; if regular courts do not act in accordance with 
established court practice, they violate the basic constitutional right of equality 
before the law, which is also a reason for constitutional complaints to be 
brought before the Constitutional Court. 
The shift I am referring to will become more and more noticeable: the 
significance of court practice and Constitutional Court practice rises when 
legislation calms down and all main codes and statutes have been adopted, 
which at the same time requires that the theory of positive law also deals 
intensively with the theory of interpretation and argumentation in law. The 
statute is an object of understanding, but this understanding can only be of good 
quality and legally safe if it is ennobled by theory as well as by court practice. 
The statute–however excellent it may be–is just an element of the legal pheno-
menon; legal theory and court practice are responsible for it as well. 
 
 
III. The transition from socialist law and the resurgence of traditional law  
 
8. The so-called Socialist Law 
 
The so-called socialist law had several complexions and did not represent a 
uniform, generally accepted concept. On the one hand, there were some classic 
Marxist standpoints (among them, especially Marx’s) on the nature of socialist 
law, on the other hand there were different interpretations and reactions to these 
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standpoints, and, additionally, also the practices in individual socialist countries 
were different.16 A very characteristic example was the former Yugoslavia–
Slovenia was its most-developed republic–which after the conflict with the 
Soviet Union in 1948 began to look for new solutions and after 1950 began 
to build up the political system of self-managing socialism. Self-managing 
socialism made it possible for the concept of socialist law to be less etatistic 
and more pluralistic than in the countries of the so-called “real socialism”. Yet 
it was also true of socialist Yugoslavia (and thus of socialist Slovenia) that the 
“bourgeois boundaries”17 of socialist law did not allow formal democracy. This 
was a very sensitive point and also the point that put the socialist state far 
below the standards of the capitalist state. 
The so-called socialist law was not a uniform concept that could be 
compared to traditional law. If I look at former Yugoslavian and Slovenian law, 
the greatest differences with respect to traditional law can be found in the 
following areas: in constitutional law, which was supposed to have been 
surpassed by the political system of socialist self-management; in classic 
property law, wherein social property was to become the foundation of a new 
system; in labour law, which was characterised by workers’ self-management; 
in commercial law where instead of contract law, a social compact should have 
developed (the so-called association of labour and means); in administrative 
law, wherein the administration was professionally degraded and fragmented 
into individual areas of interest, etc. In addition, all legal areas were eschatolo-
gically marked by the principles of socialist self-management and socialist 
morals. These principles were mostly just an ideological ornament and did 
not carry much weight in practice. An exception were the so-called reserve 
clauses, which enabled the authorities to put their political will into effect in an 
ostensibly legal manner. A classic example were some very loose definitions 
of criminal offences that were contrary to the principle Nullum crimen sine 
lege certa.18 
Among the characteristics of socialist law self-management law was often 
mentioned. Strictly speaking, self-management law was not a new kind of law 
or even a legal area (such as constitutional, civil or criminal law), but it was 
only a question of new formal sources of law comprising legal norms. These 
  
 16 Cf. Reich, N. (Ed.): Marxistische und sozialistische Rechtstheorie. Frankfurt/Main, 
1972. 
 17 Cf. Marx, K.: Kritik des Gothaer Programms. In: MEW 19. Berlin, 1972. 20–21. 
 18 Cf. Pavčnik, M.: Nullum crimen sine lege certa. Beitrag zur Gesetzesauslegung am 
Beispiel des jugoslawischen Rechts. In: Weinberger, O. und W. Fischer, M. W. (Eds.): 
Demokratie und Rationalität. Wien, 1992. 191–199. 
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new sources of law were charters (internal statutes), self-managing agreements, 
social compacts, etc., they were implemented especially in the areas of labour 
and commercial law. One great problem of self-management sources of law 
was that they were ostensible and thereby ideological, since they created the 
appearance of real self-management, whereas actually the questions had 
already been regulated in the statutes in much detail. 
 
9. Traditional Law in the Socialist Period 
 
I have already partially dealt with this question above. It was a characteristic of 
Yugoslavian and Slovenian law that they were always closely connected with 
traditional law. This law was still active in all areas that were not taken over by 
the so-called socialist law that was supposed to “surpass” traditional law (see 
especially point 8). The connection to traditional law was also made possible 
by the norms regarding the filling in of legal gaps. As mentioned above, in 
Slovenia the regulations of the Austrian Civil Code were applied, especially 
for the legal areas of the general part of civil law, for property law and for the 
law of contracts and torts, which were largely codified only in 1978 and 1980. 
 An important role was also played by the system of legal education, which 
was mostly based on traditional law and traditional legal thinking. Of course, 
also the new socialist law was taught, yet it never dominated. One should also 
bear in mind that the older professors, who had studied in the period between 
the two world wars (often at first-rate foreign universities), mostly remained 
true to scientific legal positivism. A typical representative was the above-
mentioned Professor Finžgar, who dealt with social property by interpreting 
and explaining it with the tools of classic civil law (especially property law). 
Moreover, a number of professors studied in the West (e.g. in the United 
States) also after the Second World War. Among them were Cigoj, a professor 
of civil law who developed case law thinking, and Bučar, an administrative 
law professor who also used system theory. 
 Compared to other former socialist countries, Yugoslavian and Slovenian 
theories were relatively well informed of what was happening elsewhere. If I 
take the theory of law, which is my subject, I can say that it was substantially 
more open and diverse than in other countries of “real socialism”.19 I do not 
want to say that the political system did not place ideological obstacles in the 
way of researchers (e.g. in discussions about natural law), yet they were not so 
  
 19 Cf. Perenič, A.: Relativna samostojnost prava (Relative Independence of Law). 
Ljubljana, 1981. and Pavčnik, M.: Der Begriff des Rechts in der jugoslawischen Rechtslehre, 
in: Jahrbuch für Ostrecht (München), 1989, 93–112. 
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high and formidable as if there were only one truth, without allowing for new 
research and new conclusions.20 
 
10. The New Constitutional Organisation 
 
In the transition from socialism to the new state organisation, an important and 
even key role was played by the new Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia 
that was adopted on 28 December 1991. The quality and the essence of the 
new Constitution are very different from the previous constitutional order of 
1974 when Slovenia was still a part of the Socialist Federative Republic of 
Yugoslavia. In the socialist era the foundations of the system were the right to 
self-management and social ownership (of the means of production), which 
were incorporated into a vision of a self-managing society and state that was 
determined right down to the last detail (which made it totalitarian in a certain 
sense). Basic human rights and freedoms were drowned in this vision.  
 Basic human rights were not the starting point of the system but just an 
element thereof, the  scope of which was precisely measured off in advance. It 
was characteristic of this system that it accepted the thesis of the pluralism of 
self-managing interests, yet it was not ready to institutionalise this pluralism 
legally and politically. Pluralism was acceptable as long as it remained within 
the system. Once it began to doubt the system and tried to change it, however, 
it became suspect and even open to criminal prosecution. Thus, it is certainly 
not accidental that the Communist Party was defined already in the Constitution 
as the “leading ideological and political force of the working class and of all 
working people”. 
 The form of the authority of the state corresponded to a directorial (assembly) 
system (with elements of a parliamentary and even presidential system). It is 
typical that the system as designed in the constitution did not work and the 
elements of the principle of the division of powers were more a kind of an 
ideological ornament than serious institutions. The rules of the “division of 
powers” only make sense if at the same time cultural, economic and political 
conditions are also provided that activate this “game” (of the system of checks 
and balances). The system that was de jure and de facto dominated by only one 
political party (i.e. the communist party) certainly did not harbour this ambition. 
And this made the legal form ideological: it offered exactly what its actual 
designers did not at all want. Nevertheless, the right to self-management, 
social property and the pluralism of self-managing interests made possible 
  
 20 Cf. Bröstl, A.: Troubles with Law, Justice and Nationalism. In: Rechtstheorie, 1993, 
84–85. 
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numerous particular features of the Yugoslavian order and thus distanced it 
from the typical countries of “real socialism”. 
 And now, let us return to the Constitution of independent Slovenia, which 
is centred on the classic constitutional matter (materia constitutionis).21 On the 
one hand, there are the provisions that determine the form of the (Slovenian) 
state. Slovenia is defined as a republic with a parliamentary system, as a 
democratic state wherein power is vested in the people, a territorially unified 
and indivisible state with local self-government, as a state under the rule of law 
and as a social state. The second group of provisions encompasses a catalogue 
of the classic basic human rights and freedoms, which is completely in accor-
dance with modern standards and modern constitutions. The third group of 
constitutional provisions refers to the organisation of the state. It comprises 
norms about the organisation of the central state bodies (legislative, executive 
and judicial bodies), their competencies and the relations between them. The 
relation between the legislative and the executive branches of power is designed 
in accordance with the parliamentary system (with the variant of a constructive 
vote of no confidence) and the design of the state order corresponds to the 
principle of “checks and balances”.  
 The principle of “checks and balances” is important not only in the relation 
between the legislative and the executive branches of powers, but also the 
composition and the manner of the operation of individual state bodies are such 
that a balanced operation is made possible within each body as well. A logical 
consequence of this regulation and of these principles is that also the judicial 
branch of power acquires a new position and a new quality.22 The Constitution 
especially emphasizes the independence of judges, the right to a natural judge 
(Germ. gesetzlicher Richter) and the principle of the permanence of judicial 
office. It is very important that the Constitution maintained the institution of 
the Constitutional Court, strengthened it and conferred numerous new respon-
sibilities upon it.23 De jure and de facto, the Constitutional Court is the “highest 
  
 21 Cf. Šturm, L. (Editor): Komentar Ustave Republike Slovenije (Commentary to the 
Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia). Ljubljana, 2002. 
 22 Cf. Přibáň, J.–Roberts, P.–Young, J. (Eds.): Systems of Justice in Transition. Central 
European Experiences since 1989. Aldershot, 2003. See especially the articles by Marko 
Novak (The Promising Gift of Precedents: Changes in Culture and Techniques of Judicial 
Decision-Making in Slovenia, 94–108) and Albin Igličar (The Judiciary in Slovenia: a 
Profession in the Ascendancy, 180–182). 
 23 Cf. Mavčič, A.: Slovenian Constitutional Review. Ljubljana, 1995. and Pavčnik, M.– 
Mavčič, A. (Eds.): Ustavno sodstvo (Constitutional Judiciary). Ljubljana, 2000.–As regards 
the Czech experience, see the excellent monograph of Pavel Holländer: Ústavnĕprávní 
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office of judicial power” deciding whether general legal acts are constitutional 
and legal, deciding on constitutional complaints (due to violations of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms by individual acts of the authorities) and on 
some other matters (e.g. on the possible impeachment of the President of the 
Republic, the Prime Minister and individual ministers). 
 
11. Transitional Problems and New Challenges 
 
Since I look at the problem of transition from a broader point of view and from 
within a broader period of time, this possibly makes it easier for me not to 
dramatize the situation. Therein, I am also supported by the thought of the 
Slovenian legal historian Vilfan, who was convinced that the “Slovenian 
language as the basis of national consciousness (...) was preserved in suitable 
historical circumstances” and that “thus, Slovenes–in accordance with their 
historical situation and environment–have always been completely normal 
people.”24 
 I do not quote this in order to show any kind of self-satisfaction or as if I 
did not want to admit there are any problems, but simply because I think that 
the problems are anything but black and white. Neither is this purely a 
transition from the period of socialist law because this law has always been 
connected with traditional law nor are we entering a new period of traditional 
law that would be wide open and waiting for us. The traditional law to which 
we are returning is not static, but is in constant movement and itself confronted 
with challenges and open questions.25 
 It is undisputable, however, that foreign examples and foreign solutions 
cannot be uncritically transferred to the local legal system. The revival of 
traditional law must occur in accordance with historical and legal tradition, it 
must consider comparable foreign examples and decide in favour of those 
solutions and developments that fit into the local conditions.26 Von Kirchmann 
                                                                                                                                                 
argumentace. Ohlédnutí po deseti letech Ústavního soudu (Constitutional Argumentation. 
Considerations after Ten Years of the Constitutional Court). Praha, 2003. 
 24 Vilfan, S.: Zgodovinska pravotvornost in Slovenci (Historische Fähigkeit zur Rechts-
bildung und die Slowenen). Ljubljana, 1996. 481. 
 25 At the level of principles, cf. Nahtigal, M.: Vloga prava v tranziciji (The Role of 
Law in Transition). Ljubljana, 2002. 
 26 Compare with the instructions on how to fill legal gaps. See the Courts Act (1994): 
“If a civil law matter cannot be solved on the basis of valid regulations, the judge considers 
a regulation intended for similar cases. If the solution of the matter is nevertheless legally 
doubtful, he decides in accordance with the general principles of legal order in the country. 
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would probably say that it must be the law which is the most intrinsic with 
regard to the local conditions. Attention must also be paid to the fact that no 
solutions (either local or foreign or both) are introduced which are not in 
mutual harmony or are even mutually exclusive. 
 The transition from socialism to traditional law evidently has taken more 
time than originally expected. This is especially true of the privatisation of 
the economy and the denationalisation of once nationalized property. These 
processes are often legally very demanding and take much time (especially if the 
complications are dealt with in administrative as well as in court proceedings). It 
is equally–and possibly even more–important that no durable and firm political 
blocks (with corresponding political parties) have developed as yet and that a 
political culture which accepts the values of a state governed by the rule of law 
and  those of a social state (together with the system of checks and balances) is 
still under development. 
 The question of an appropriate political culture27 is among the most sensitive 
of issues. New political parties often hide behind the principle of the division 
of powers and are more interested in the division itself (somehow in the spirit 
of Divide et impera!) than in the divided exercise of power that has to be 
mutually harmonized and controlled. A logical continuation of these views is 
that most parties do not have a well thought-out attitude to the social state and 
to social justice. Market fundamentalism and the “liberal paradigm” that any 
acquisition on the basis of (non-monopolistic) market exchange is legal, 
legitimate and just28 are just too strong and without any real competition that 
would stand up to them to any significant degree and in an efficient manner. 
Major positive changes will only occur when a sufficiently strong socially 
oriented political group is formed and when also the Constitutional Court has 
the opportunity to intervene more frequently by means of its decisions. If the 
Constitutional Court received a greater number of proposals, it could react in 
an appropriate manner because the principle of a social state is one of the most 
important constitutional principles.  
 The reactions to the new challenges of traditional law are and will be some-
how different in individual (former socialist) states because also their historical 
                                                                                                                                                 
In this he acts in accordance with legal tradition and fixed findings of legal knowledge” 
(italics added by M. P., Art. 3/2). 
 27 Cf. Gessner, V.–Hoeland, A.–Varga, Cs. (eds): European Legal Cultures. Aldershot 
(etc.) 1996. 
 28 Rus, V.: Enakost in pravičnost (Equality and Justice). In: Zalar, A. (Ed.): Enakost in 
pravičnost v pravni in socialni državi (Equality and Justice in a State that is Social and 
Governed by the Rule of Law). Ljubljana, 1998, 14. 
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development and their present starting points are different. Concerning Slovenia, 
I have already explained its peculiarities and certain advantages in comparison 
with the former countries of “real socialism”. But there are also new challenges 
and new circumstances that cannot be avoided. Fortunately, the approaching 
membership in the European Union has acted in a cohesive manner. The task of 
the new members of the EU is to adopt and realize the fundamental economic 
freedoms that refer to the free movement of goods, the free movement of 
workers, the right of establishment, the free movement of services and the free 
movement of capital and payments. A prerequisite for all four said freedoms is 
that traditional civil and commercial law are valid in all countries. Slovenia has 
already adopted appropriate laws in these areas. There should especially be 
mentioned the Companies Act (1993), Protection of Competition Act (1993), 
Prevention of Restriction of Competition Act (1999), Securities Market Act 
(1999), Maritime Code (2001), Code of Obligations (2001) and Property Code 
(2002). 
 European unification and even wider globalisation processes also contain 
numerous hidden traps and dangers. For a small country and a small nation, it is 
of special importance to maintain the cultural and national identity. In principle, 
small countries will probably not be able to design the economic and political 
form of the EU and other broader international communities in a decisive 
manner. The power of small countries resides in their mutual cooperation and 
the preservation of the differences that are a conditio sine qua non of any 
national identity. At the same time, this is also the reserve clause and the limit 
beyond which the exercise of a part of national competence cannot be trans-
ferred to international organisations and communities. The European Union is 
“unity in variety” and “variety in unity”.29 If the European Union does not accept 
this condition, it would make itself look ridiculous. Thus, the real question is 
not whether there should be variety or not, the real question is how and to what 
degree this variety should be put into effect and how harmoniously (and 
colourfully) the European orchestra should play. 
 
  
 29 Cf. the special issue “Evropski izziv” (“European Challenge”), in: Nova revija 
(Ljubljana), 2003, 252–253, 1–473. 
